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Abstract 
From my previous field research, I found that most of the organizations have very poor 
security practices.  Some organizations may be aware of the consequences of information 
security breaches, but would rather take the risk.  Some are not knowledgeable enough and 
partly because they have very limited resources to allocate in areas that return no benefits.  
Some of them may think that their business partners will help to protect their information.  As 
a result, this is a kind of “I don’t care about what you care about” practice.  In other words, 
natures of these loopholes have been investigated and explored.  The next thing is to find 
solutions to fill this security gap. 
Building on the findings of previous research, this paper identifies the prescriptions 
that will reduce business information vulnerability.  I first review the current information 
security models or frameworks, all of which have shortcomings, and then discuss ISO9000 
and the Capability Maturity Model, which can solve some of the problems that arise from 
business information vulnerability.  To fill the solution gap, I finally develop a new security 
assessment model.  Due to space limitation, details of this assessment model development 
processes will be discussed in my other research paper. 
 
Keywords: Information security management, modern business, security assessment model, 
CMM, ISO17799 
 
 
1. Introduction 
We are human beings who dislike the constraints imposed by inflexible security 
practices in our job performance.  Password management is so inflexible (Parker 1998) and 
binding that without positive motivation to help users realize the inherent rewards of 
information security, the situation will not change and will be exacerbated if penalties are 
imposed on infringements.  Computer security technologists have focused on the security of 
computer systems rather than on the human aspect, and this continues to dominate 
information security provision to the detriment of protecting information from abuses and 
misuses. Moreover, if users do not have much knowledge and training in information 
security, how can they protect the information assets of their organizations?  This is actually 
a matter of education.  In other words, security is a management problem more than a 
technical problem. 
Another implication is the lack of public pressure such as an insistence on certification 
in information security.  Because there is no public pressure on businessmen to address 
information security, they are usually concerned with more tangible aspects of their 
organizations. 
The final implication is the pace of technology.  Computer technology has recently 
taken such a great stride forward that most of the past information technology methodologies 
and concepts are outdated. Hence, some practitioners cannot keep pace with the increasingly 
changing technology. 
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With these implications in mind, we can now discuss information security prescriptions 
that are suitable to the modern business world. 
 
2. Review of Current Information Security Models and Frameworks 
Before I explore the possible criteria for a new information security model, I will 
review the current information security models and frameworks.  There are many such 
models or frameworks, but most of them are the variations of the early examples. For 
instance, the Australian AS/NZS4444 is an adaptation of BS7799.  Thus, the foundation 
models and frameworks are mentioned as follows. 
 
2.1 Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) 
This is also known as the Orange Book, and was developed by the U.S. Department of 
Defense in 1983 (Available from http://www.radium.ncsc.mil/tpep/library/rainbow/5200.28-
STD.html).  Its basic security control objectives are security policy, accountability, and 
assurance.  Criticisms of it are that the whole blueprint is ‘more than enough’ or ‘over the 
top’, but that it lacks important features, including an ‘automatic log out’, ‘password ageing’, 
‘password format control’, ‘terminal dependent login’, ‘time of day/day of week access 
control’, that is ‘lacks commercial awareness and tangible procedure’, that it does “not 
explain how the security of a system should be evaluated’, that it ‘fails to keep pace with 
technology’, and that it neglects the human aspect of information security.  Parker (1998) 
argued that this model does not distinguish between confidentiality and possession, and fails 
to discuss the integrity and authenticity of information. 
 
2.2 Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC) 
This is also known as the Green Book, and was proposed by the U.K. Department of 
Trade & Industry in 1990 (Available from http://www.bsi.de/zertifiz/itkrit/itsec.htm).  Its 
coverage is wider than that of TCSEC but still has many basic weaknesses.  Criticisms of it 
are that it ‘lacks commercial awareness and tangible procedures’, ‘does not explain how the 
security of a system should be evaluated’, ‘fails to keep pace with technology”, and, like the 
TCSEC model, that it neglects the human aspect of information security. 
 
2.3 General CIA Model 
Besides the TCSEC and ITSEC models, other models employ the basic nucleus of 
Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability (CIA).  This approach has been criticized for 
‘overlooking many viable vulnerabilities’, ‘missing the authenticity of information and the 
misrepresentation of concerns’, being ‘too focused on destruction, disclosure, use, and 
modification while missing withholding, locating, repudiating, and observing information’, 
and the more important points of neglecting the ‘human aspect’ of information security and 
‘certification’. 
 
2.4 Generally Accepted System Security Principles (GASSP) 
This model was developed by a group of computer technology experts under the 
auspices of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (Available from 
http://www.oecd.org) in 1992.  Its principles sound good but the model attracts much 
criticism, such as it only addresses the modification, denial of use, and disclosure of 
knowledge while it neither addresses the concept of information nor explains who would or 
could cause losses.  It is good at addressing education, awareness, and training measures but 
says nothing about the need to motivate people to apply that education or awareness.  It also 
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does not address concerns about business, scientific engineering, and artistic information in 
desks and filing cabinets, printed on paper, or spoken. 
 
2.5 BS7799 Model 
This is a code of practice that was developed by British Computer Society and several 
European government agencies in 1995.  Again, it was written by a group of computer 
security technologists.  It addresses the possession, authenticity, and utility of information, 
but does not address the major threats to information.  However, it is vague about concepts 
such as auditing and reviewing, and known and possessed integrity and accuracy.  Moreover, 
though it has certification components, it offers no certification in the mature stages.  
Nevertheless, it is the best of the models and is the most adopted by practitioners. 
 
2.6 Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology Framework 
The first version of this framework was developed by a group of European chapters of 
the Information Systems Audit and Control Association in 1995.  It provides more than 300-
detailed control objectives that can be categorized into three dimensions: IT domains, 
Information criteria, and IT resources.  It is mainly criticized for its confusing definitions of 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability, and that it is still in its infancy.  Although its third 
version (Available from www.isaca.org/cobit/htm) includes a maturity model, it emphasizes 
on IT governance and there is neither clearly defined key goal indicator nor process for each 
of the five levels.  Thus, it is just a conceptual framework only. 
 
2.7 Summary 
The following table summarises the above-mentioned models and frameworks. 
 Specifications Strengths Weaknesses Extend of Adoption
TCSEC Security 
policy, 
accountability, 
assurance 
Coverage too 
much and too 
high level 
Lack important 
features and human 
aspect, weak in 
confidentiality, 
integrity and 
authenticity 
Jack of all trades 
with too little 
practical value 
ITSEC Similar to 
TCSEC  
Coverage 
wider than 
TCSEC 
Lack human aspect 
and commercial 
awareness, not explain 
how to evaluate, out-
dated technology 
Jack of all trades 
with too little 
practical value 
CIA Confidentiality
, Integrity and 
Availability 
Generic 
enough 
Lack human aspect, 
weak in vulnerability, 
authenticity and 
repudiation, no 
certification 
Good for teaching 
purpose only 
GASSP Industrial 
accepted 
practices 
Good 
principles 
Lack human aspect, 
not addressing 
concept of 
information nor 
explaining who would 
or could cause losses 
Coverage not 
sufficient nor 
complete as an 
assessment model 
BS7799 Possession, 
authenticity 
Complete 
coverage with 
Lack human aspect, 
vague about auditing 
High extend of 
adoption 
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and utility of 
information 
certification 
component 
and improvement 
COBIT Detailed 
control 
objectives 
Highly 
structured with 
maturity 
concept 
Too conceptual or 
high level, difficult to 
implement 
Good guidelines for 
businessmen to 
start or follow but 
not good for 
assessment 
 
3. Relevance to BS7799 and ISO9000 
ISO9000 is primarily concerned with quality management, or what the organization 
does to ensure that its products conform to its customer’s requirements or simply fit a 
purpose.  From its introduction in 1987 to the end of December 1999, 343643 ISO9000 
certificates were awarded in 150 countries. 
ISO9000 has been extremely successful worldwide.  The main reason for this success is 
that there is public pressure on suppliers to be accredited with certification such as that of 
ISO9000.  Being ISO9000 accredited or registered can bring a basic confidence to the buyers. 
As the rationale of ISO9000 is a kind of total quality management (TQM) 
(International Standards Organization, ‘ISO9001, Quality Systems – Model for Quality, 
Assurance in Design/Development, Production, Installation, and Services’, 1987), achieving 
culture change and changing management behavior are two critical success factors.  Besides, 
Tingey (1997) considered that ISO emphasizes the basic elements of quality management and 
assesses with a very rigorous auditing model.  A good information security model also 
requires these factors that would improve the commonly committed practice of “I don’t care 
what you care about”.  Moreover, a majority of IT security problems stem from some sort of 
accident, and many stem from a lack of understanding, bad software, lack of procedures and 
working practices, inadequate auditing, and inadequate disaster recovery planning.  In other 
words, IT security needs both technical standards as well as quality standards wich is based 
on ISO9000 philosophy. 
Though the above discussion indicates that ISO9000 can be used as a framework to 
build an information security model, it is not an exhaustive list of the mission critical 
information security practices.  Tingey (1997) discussed that while ISO conducts audits to a 
specific set of requirements, it does not mandate a specific system.  In contrast, BS7799, 
which was the predecessor of ISO17799, contained an exhaustive list of information security 
practices.  Tingey (1997) argued that the assessment usually involves the idea of ensuring 
that there are sufficient controls in place; thus, we should have a reference list of controls like 
BS7799.  Moreover, the worst feature of ISO9000 is that it includes only two levels, i.e. ‘ISO 
certified’ or ‘not ISO certified’.  Thus, it cannot help organizations in improving the 
processes. 
ISO17799 seems like it could be used as a valid information security model to govern 
business information security.  This is incorrect because BS7799, which was the predecessor 
of ISO17799, does not include the concept of capability maturity and only has two states of 
certification, i.e. certified or not.  However, as ISO17799 cannot be effectively modified to 
include maturity concepts, BS7799 should be used as the foundation on which to build a new 
security model.  
 
4. Relevance to Capability Maturity Model (CMM) 
The Software Engineering Institute (SEI) (Available from 
http://www.sei.cmu.edu/cmm) of Carnegie Mellon University is a research and development 
center that is sponsored by the U.S. Department of Defense through the Office of the Under 
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Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. The SEI’s core purpose is 
to help others to make measured improvements in their software engineering capabilities.  Its 
vision is “the right software, delivered defect free, on time and on cost, every time”.  One of 
its products is the Capability Maturity Model (CMM) (Humphrey 1989).  While ISO9000 is 
driven from outside the organization, generally via contractual agreement, CMM is driven 
from within the organization, generally focused on continuous improvement for the sake of 
staying competitive. 
 
Figure 1 - Generic Capability Maturity Model 
 
The CMM assist organizations in maturing their people, process, and technology assets 
to improve long-term business performance by providing a 5-level frame of reference for the 
reflection of an organization’s relative strengths and weaknesses (Paulk 1995).  Each of these 
levels indicates an increased capability that has key process areas/practices to predict the 
results of using the organization’s current software process.  To gain a higher level of 
capability maturity we need experience and we need to learn from experience. 
As the CMM’s rationale is a kind of continuous improvement process management, it 
can be used to transfer security assurance to the development process to reduce experience 
and lengthy post-development evaluation process.  If we think about the capability maturity 
levels as characterizing the degrees of awareness that the organization has about its security 
practices, then each maturity level indicates a significant increase in the degree of conscious 
effort to produce the awareness of security practices; the degree of conscious effort to 
manage and control the effort to produce the awareness of security practices and the degree 
of involvement from everyone in the organization in managing, controlling, and improving 
these efforts.  As the organization increases its awareness about security practices, it becomes 
increasingly capable of monitoring and changing its behavior, which in turn affects its 
capability maturity level.  A good information security model also requires these features.  
Some organizations lack knowledge of where they are and how they should go about 
developing best practice: usually they go too far (jump the step) or they go too slow (and can 
even return to a lower level).  As a result, they waste many resources but still cannot head 
toward best practice.  Thus, the CMM can provide a systematic way of improving their 
awareness from the initial level, to the repeatable, defined, managed, and finally optimized 
levels. 
Although there is a third-party extension of the CMM called the Systems Security 
Engineering Capability Maturity Model (SSE-CMM), which describes the essential 
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characteristics of an organization’s security engineering process, it is only a consultative 
model that is not clear enough to lead practitioners, and it has no influence (as it does not 
employ an auditing model like ISO9000) over those who deliberately neglect the awareness 
of information security.  Moreover, it lacks a complete assessment or appraisal mechanism to 
determine the level of capability maturity to which an organization belongs.  In contrast, 
BS7799 has a very clear set of processes and objectives to be met since it can guide the 
practitioners step by step to achieve. 
 
5. Criteria for Future Information Security Assessment Models 
As shown in the above review of various current information security models and 
frameworks, BS7799 should be used as a baseline model in developing a security assessment 
model.  However, this model lacks the capability maturity concept and an influential 
authoritative certification scheme.  To cater for the capability maturity concept so that 
practitioners know where they are and how they are proceeding, incorporating the CMM 
concept into BS7799 is appropriate.  We can classify various sections of BS7799 into each of 
the CMM’s key process areas.  To cater for the need to be authoritative, the ISO9000 
approach can be used to certify organizations through auditing as being at a suitable level of 
capability maturity so that business partners can recognize each other’s security practice 
level.  If a higher-level company wishes to deal with a lower-level company, it should have 
enough alertness to bear the security risk of exchanging business information.  Besides this, a 
progressive organization can know its current information security situation and set goals to 
move to a new level of maturity. 
Thus, a combination of BS7799, ISO9000, and the CMM can form an effective new 
information security maturity model. 
 
6. Creation of a new Information Security Assessment Model 
Fitting the BS7799 components into the CMM can create a new security assessment 
model called ‘SAM’.  This combination can enjoy the benefits of using the BS7799 
authoritative document, which is assumed to represent all possible information security tasks, 
while employing the state-of-art CMM improvement concept to indicate the level that is 
attained by a particular organization or the space for future improvement. 
Caputo (1998) compared software process improvement to choreography.  
Choreography involves control of the body’s components, guiding one or more dancers 
through certain steps and through changing rhythms while maintaining balance to create a 
best performance for their audience. Likewise, software process improvement involves the 
control of an organization, and directing individuals through certain activities and through 
changing conditions while maintaining a balance to create the best services for their 
customers.  In other words, implementing the CMM is like learning dancing: both activities 
have levels for the performers to achieve and target toward which they can improve.  Before 
the implementation, let us consider the components inside BS7799. 
BS7799 is composed of ten sections, each of which has sub-sections.  The ten sections 
represent the ten domains of information security, and their sub-sections further describe the 
domains by categorizing and listing tasks to be accomplished.  These tasks that are very 
much similar to the key process areas in the CMM; they are logically listed but the sequences 
cannot show any increase of maturity level.  The main difficulties in fitting these tasks into 
the CMM are that the tasks in each domain have different maturity levels, and that the two 
models do not have the same number of tasks in each level.  In other words, the ten domains 
are not of equal strength at various maturity levels. 
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To fit these tasks into the CMM, let us investigate the criteria of each CMM level so 
that appropriate BS7799 components can be fitted.  In the CMM, key process areas are 
actually the requirements for achieving that maturity level, and they specify the areas on 
which the organization should focus to elevate its processes to that maturity level.  Each key 
process area specifies a group of activities, which are called key practices that can 
collectively satisfy the goals of that key process area.  A higher level can be attained if all of 
the key process areas of lower levels have been attained. In other words, the key process 
areas of lower level are subsets of those of higher levels.  During the fitting, care must be 
taken to ensure dependence among the tasks of IS7799 and adherence to the spirit of the 
CMM. 
At initial level (1), the processes are used on an ad hoc basis.  There is no key process 
area.  All organizations that are using information technology can be regarded as at least at 
level 1 of the ‘SAM’ model. 
Repeatable level (2), applies to organizations in which project management practices 
are well established even though organization-wide processes may not exist.  Most of the key 
process areas focus on project management.  This level emphasizes consistency in and 
control of the requirements, planning, tracking, and assurance of component separation. 
At the defined level (3), the software processes for the organization have been 
precisely defined and regularly followed.  The organization may learn from different projects 
and subsequently improve the processes to benefit future projects.  Key process areas target 
the institutionalization of processes and some additional processes for the engineering of 
software.  This level emphasizes organization-wide focus, training, inter-group coordination, 
peer reviews, and integrated management. 
At the managed level (4), quantitative understanding of the process capability makes it 
possible to quantitatively predict and control the process performance on a project.  Key 
process areas revolve around quantitatively managing the process and projects.  As there is 
no quantitative treatment of information security, auditable and measurable components are 
used as the key concepts in this maturity level. 
At the optimizing level (5), the process improves continuously, with level 4 providing 
the mechanisms to quantitatively evaluate the effectiveness of process enhancement 
initiatives.  This level emphasizes defect prevention, technology change management and 
process change management. 
Finally, the above results can be summarized to produce the following ‘SAM’ 
information security assessment model.  Due to space limitation, the details of how this 
model is derived will be mentioned in my other research paper. 
“SAM” Information Security Assessment Model
 
Maturity Level Key Process Areas / Practices 
2 3 4 5 
1. Security Policy 
? Information security policy 
    
i.  Information security policy document √    
ii.  Review and evaluation  √   
2. Security organization 
? Information security infrastructure 
    
i.  Management information security forum  √   
ii.  Information security co-ordination  √   
iii.  Allocation of information security responsibilities  √   
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iv.  Authorization process for information processing 
facilities 
 √   
v.  Specialist information security advice  √   
vi.  Co-operation between organizations  √   
vii.  Independent review of information security  √   
? Security of third party access     
i.  Identification of risks from third party access √    
ii.  Security requirements in third party contracts  √   
? Outsourcing     
i.  Security requirements in outsourcing contracts  √   
3. Asset classification and control 
? Accountability for assets 
    
i.  Inventory of assets   √  
? Information classification √    
i.  Classification guidelines  √   
ii.  Information labeling and handling     
4. Personnel security 
? Security in job definition and resourcing 
    
i.  Including security in job responsibilities √    
ii.  Personnel screening and policy  √   
iii.  Confidentiality agreements  √   
iv.  Terms and conditions of employment  √   
? User training     
i.  Information security education and training  √   
? Responding to security incidents and malfunctions     
i. Reporting security incidents  √   
ii. Reporting security weaknesses  √   
iii. Reporting software malfunctions  √   
iv. Learning from incidents  √   
v. Disciplinary process   √  
5. Physical and environmental security 
? Secure areas 
    
i. Physical security perimeter √    
ii. Physical entry controls √    
iii. Securing offices, rooms and facilities  √   
iv. Working in secure areas  √   
v. Isolated delivery and loading areas  √   
? Equipment security     
i. Equipment siting and protection √    
ii.  Power supplies √    
iii.  Cabling security √    
iv.  Equipment maintenance √    
v.  Security of equipment off-premises √    
vi.  Secure disposal or re-use of equipment √    
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? General controls     
i.  Clear desk and clear screen policy √    
ii.  Removal of property √    
6. Communications and operations management 
? Operational procedures and responsibilities 
    
i.  Document operating procedures √    
ii.  Operational change control    √
iii.  Incident management procedures    √
iv.  Segregation of duties  √   
v.  Separation of development and operational 
facilities 
 √   
vi.  External facilities management √    
? System planning and acceptance     
i.  Capacity planning √    
ii.  System acceptance   √  
? Protection against malicious software     
i.  Controls against malicious software   √  
? Housekeeping     
i.  Information back-up    √
ii.  Operator logs   √  
iii.  Fault logging   √  
? Network management     
i.  Network controls  √   
? Media handling and security     
i.  Management of removable computer media  √   
ii.  Disposal of media  √   
iii.  Information handling procedures √    
iv.  Security of system documentation    √
? Exchanges of information and software     
i.  Information and software exchange agreements √    
ii.  Security of media in transit √    
iii.  Electronic commerce security √    
iv.  Security of electronic mail √    
v.  Security of electronic office systems √    
vi.  Publicly available systems √    
vii.  Other forms of information exchange √    
7. Access control 
? Business requirement for access control 
    
i.  Access control policy √    
? User access management     
i.  User registration  √   
ii.  Privilege management  √   
iii.  User password management  √   
iv.  Review of user access rights  √   
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? User responsibilities     
i.  Password use √    
ii.  Unattended user equipment √    
? Network access control     
i.  Policy on use of network services √    
ii.  Enforced path  √   
iii.  User authentication for external connections  √   
iv.  Node authentication  √   
v.  Remote diagnostic port protection    √
vi.  Segregation in networks  √   
vii.  Network connection control  √   
viii.  Network routing control  √   
ix.  Security of network services √    
? Operating system access control     
i.  Automatic terminal identification √    
ii.  Terminal log-on procedures √    
iii.  User identification and authentication  √   
iv.  Password management system  √   
v.  Use of system utilities √    
vi.  Duress alarm to safeguard users  √   
vii.  Terminal time-out  √   
viii.  Limitation of connection time  √   
? Application access control     
i.  Information access restriction √    
ii.  Sensitive system isolation  √   
? Monitoring system access and use     
i.  Event logging   √  
ii.  Monitoring system use   √  
iii.  Clock synchronization   √  
? Mobile computing and teleworking     
i.  Mobile computing  √   
ii.  Teleworking  √   
8. System development and maintenance 
? Security requirements of systems 
    
i.  Security requirements analysis and specification √    
? Security in application systems     
i.  Input data validation  √   
ii.  Control of internal processing  √   
iii.  Message authentication  √   
iv.  Output data validation  √   
? Cryptographic controls     
i.  Policy on the use of cryptographic controls √    
ii.  Encryption  √   
iii.  Digital signatures  √   
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iv.  Non-repudiation services  √   
v.  Key management  √   
? Security of system files     
i.  Control of operational software  √   
ii.  Protection of system test data    √
iii.  Access control to program source library  √   
? Security in development and support processes     
i.  Change control procedures    √
ii.  Technical review of operating system changes    √
iii.  Restrictions on changes to software packages  √   
iv.  Covert channels and Trojan code  √   
v.  Outsourced software development √    
9. Business continuity management 
? Aspects of business continuity management 
    
i.  Business continuity management process    √
ii.  Business continuity and impact analysis    √
iii.  Writing and implementing continuity plans    √
iv.  Business continuity planning framework    √
v.  Testing, maintaining and re-assessing business 
continuity plans 
   √
10. Compliance 
? Compliance with legal requirements 
    
i.  Identification of applicable legislation √    
ii.  Intellectual property rights √    
iii.  Safeguarding of organizational records √    
iv.  Data protection and privacy of personal 
information 
√    
v.  Prevention of misuse of information processing 
facilities 
√    
vi.  Regulation of cryptographic controls √    
vii.  Collection of evidence √    
? Reviews of security policy and technical compliance     
i.  Compliance with security policy  √   
ii.  Technical compliance checking  √   
? System audit considerations     
i.  System audit controls   √  
ii.  Protection of system audit tools    √
   
 
7. Discussion 
 
7.1 Applicability 
Awareness of Business Partner’s Security Practices: The primary purpose of creating 
this model is to provide guidelines to judge the maturity level of an organization’s 
information security practices.  Using CMM’s concept, a higher level implies that the 
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organization has very good information security practices, and a lower level implies that the 
organization does not recognize the importance of good information security practices.  Once 
this classification can be made, each organization will have sufficient information and 
awareness of their business partners’ information security practices.  This is useful because 
the organizations can conduct some risk management exercises before dealing with new 
partners or customers.  The risk assessment tasks of this risk management can take the 
partners’ information security maturity level into account and make correct decisions in 
dealing with new partners or customers.  Thus, when organization A (with a higher maturity 
level) deals with organization B (with a lower maturity level), organization A should be 
ready to remedy the contamination of data that could be caused by organization B’s worse 
security practices.  If organization B has no special core competencies or other political 
factors, organization A should not deal with it, because any contamination of data or 
computer threats would make organization A lose its competitive advantage or affect its 
relations with other organizations of high maturity levels.  As a result, the maturity level of 
organization A may be downgraded if it continues to deal with lower-level maturity 
organizations.  Obviously, it is better for two organizations to have the same maturity level 
before they deal the business.  This would tend to push a lower-level maturity organization to 
upgrade its maturity level to be able to deal with all organizations, as is the spirit of CMM.  
In other words, having good information security practices would become a pre-requisite for 
every organization.  “I don’t care about what you care about” should no longer be a dominant 
attitude.  This is very similar to the effect of ISO9000: if an organization has good quality 
management, it is perceived to have good quality products/services and other organizations 
favor those products/services (The ISO Survey of ISO9000 and ISO14000 Certificates’, 
Ninth Cycle, International Organization for Standardization).  The difference is that the SAM 
model has many levels while ISO9000 has only one level. 
Yardstick for Security Practices Improvement: The model also can serve as a yardstick 
by which organizations can measure their improvement in information security practices.  As 
mentioned in Previous research, some organizations are not knowledgeable enough or do not 
have the proper concept of how information security practices can be performed more 
effectively.  Even if they want to improve they do not know how to proceed.  With this 
model, however, if an organization wishes to improve its information security practices, then 
it can try to fulfill all key process areas of the targeted level and then proceed to the next 
maturity level.  During this exercise, the learner can use the guidelines from the model to 
implement the desired security maturity level.  This is very similar to the functions of the 
CMM: an organization can upgrade its software improvement status by implementing each 
milestone’s key process areas.  Thus, the ‘SAM’ model can have educational applications in 
business organizations. 
 
7.2 Limitation of the model 
Certification: For ISO9000 certification, a lead assessor needs to check whether there is 
non-compliance with the organization’s quality management standards.  After the 
certification, the organization needs internal auditors to maintain the standards.  As ISO9000 
is a quality management standard, there is no need to invest in any fixed assets, and the only 
investment is in initial certification costs and internal auditor salaries.  For the ‘SAM’ model, 
because it is similar to the CMM, continuous improvement is needed to maintain the maturity 
level or to enhance security practices to jump to a higher level.  Usually, to fulfill the 
requirements of some key process areas, organizations would need to invest in expensive 
hardware and software.  Hence, in addition to the certification costs, they would need to 
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invest in continuous improvement costs and substantial fixed assets.  Thus, it is a relatively 
more expensive game compared to ISO9000.   
Assessment Method: The CMM uses CMM-based appraisal for internal process 
improvement (CBA-IPI) (Software Engineering Institute 1996).  An assessment team that is 
led by an SEI-authorized lead assessor performs the assessment.  During the assessment, the 
team members collect information about the software process of the organization via maturity 
questionnaires, documentation, and interviews (Humphrey 1989).  In contrast, the SAM 
model is related to information security, and it would be relatively difficult to assess whether 
the target organization had fulfilled the requirement or not.  Thus, the assessment would need 
several certified experts inside the team, and it would not be easy to find so many experts: 
besides having passed the required examinations, they would have to be very experienced in 
related fields, preferably in similar industries. 
Continuous Auditing: As security technology has taken a great stride forward in the 
past few years, it is easy to obtain security protection devices and have methods updated.  
Hence, continuous auditing had to be conducted like financial auditing, which has to be done 
one to four times a year.  
 
8. Conclusion 
With the abovementioned criteria and the creation of a new information security 
maturity model, we can move to more perfect business information security.  One thing that 
cannot be controlled is the new tricks that are being played by hackers who would like to take 
advantage of the design loopholes of the state-of-the-art Internet technology (Parker 1998).  
As the initial purpose of Internet was for academic research information exchange, this 
vulnerability is partly attributable to the design weakness of Internet protocol version 4 
(ipv4).  This is because the current Internet was created for APARNET project that was 
strictly controlled under Acceptable Use Policies (Miller 1999).  Hopefully with the new ipv6 
(which provides more Internet addresses and better security control like Source Demand 
Routing Protocol, Security Association Bundle, Authentication Header, Encapsulating 
Security Payload, etc.) (Miller 1999) and the refined security maturity model, most security 
problems can be controlled.  Last but not least, we have to be well equipped in a Faster 
Learning Organization world so that most new security problems can be prevented, detected 
or corrected.  In fact, Dr. W. Edwards Deming had mentioned that we should “End the 
practice of awarding business on the basis of price tag …”. 
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